



Reliance
Industries Limited

**Process Hazard Analysis - Enabler
to risk based decisions through
facility life cycle**


Prashanthi Bhupathi

Any statement, opinion, prediction, comment, or observation made in this presentation/publication are those of the presenter/author only and in no condition should be construed necessarily representing the policy and intent of Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL).

The information presented herein are of the presenter/author's own and in no way RIL attracts any liability for any inconsistency or irregularity in terms of the accuracy completeness, veracity, or truth of the content of the presentation/publication. In addition, RIL shall not be liable for any copyright infringement and misrepresentation for the presented content as the content is presumed in good faith to be a creation of presenter's/author's own mind.

The scope of this presentation/publication is strictly for knowledge sharing purposes and not necessarily to provide any advice or recommendation to the audience/readers. Any endorsement, recommendation, suggestion, or advice made by the presenter/author shall be in his personal capacity and not in professional capacity as an employee of RIL. Any person acting on such endorsement, recommendation, suggestion, or advice will himself/herself be responsible for any injury/damage.

Process Event Sequence




Process Hazard Analysis



What failed ?

- Not recognizing process hazards
- Inadequate application of PHA for MoC, cyclic reviews
- Not identifying barriers appropriate to risks
- Inadequate knowledge of hazards with PHA teams

PHA as a risk reduction tool




Poll Question # 1

Select the option which is false in PHA studies.

- a. Understand process hazards and controls better
- b. Identify gaps in design and operational practices
- c. Make process simpler and safer
- d. Understand risks that have impact on workforce and community
- e. Propose recommendations to reduce risk
- f. Perform detailed design of barriers

What PHA can help identify?



Overt issues

- ✓ Human factor issues e.g.,
- ✓ Inaccessible valves, unclear instructions
- ✓ Confusing DCS graphics and screens
- ✓ Bypassed controls
- ✓ Physical degradation of assets

Inherent issues

- ✓ Chemical reactivity at normal & transient conditions
- ✓ Incompatible metallurgy used in the unit
- ✓ Deficiencies in design adequacy of barriers
- ✓ Intermediate storages (chlorine), fragile components in the unit (sight glasses) that can be eliminated
- ✓ Threats to occupied buildings due to releases

..... and many more!

Hazard Identification

- Hazard identification checklists
- Chemical Reactivity tool
- Reactivity Screening
- Field Tour checklists
- Relative ranking methods



Hazop/What-if

- Equipment specific checklists
- Process design specific checklists
- Tailor-made guidewords

WHAT IF...?

Human Factors

- Checklists to identify issues
- 3D model reviews



Inherently Safer Approach

- Checklist to identify opportunities for inherently safer process
- Readily available case studies on ISD



Consequence Analysis

- Simple to complex models to evaluate impacts



Facility Siting

- Checklists to recognise siting issues, including full-time and part-time occupied locations



Tank body leaks

Tank filling / emptying line breaks

Tank flange leaks

Inerting system fails

Tank seal fails

Tank vent plugs

Tank overflow

Tank rim seal fire

Tank heating or cooling system fails

Tank exposed to external fire

Tank instrumentation fails

Tank lining deteriorates



Tank rupture disks are sized improperly

Tank is overpressured


Tank agitator fails

Tank roof collapse

Tank contents circulation system fails off

Tank contents react

PHA studies – through asset life cycle



Do you use different types of PHA techniques for your entire life cycle in your organisation?


- a. Yes
- b. No

PHA for MoC helps review potential to :

- Introduce process hazards (hazardous chemicals, larger inventory, equipment, etc.) through change
- Implement change considering safer options
- Effect on existing process safety barriers
- Predict process safety risks at proposal stage
- Assess if change meets legal/regulatory requirements/ Introduces new requirements



- Define minimum intensity of PHA application for each MoC
- Elaborate PHAs for changes
 - *involving highly hazardous materials*
 - *introducing new chemicals*
 - *capacity enhancements*
 - *push equipment/ process towards operating limits*
 - *involving changes to critical barriers*
- PHA often supplemented by design adequacy checks, process simulation output, major incident learnings, etc.
- Even if a PHA recommendation is implemented, detailed evaluation is needed during design engineering to ensure no new hazards are introduced



- The column handles highly flammable material at auto-ignition temperatures
- Material also has content of corrosive material, as part of feed from upstream units that concentrates at the column overhead
- Key controls on the column include tripping of reboiler heating medium upon high pressure and feed cutoff; auto deluge activation upon sensing flammability

Case-1 : A parallel train of the column and associated equipment is planned to enhance capacity

Case-2 : The condenser has repetitive issues of corrosion and PHA team recommended to replace with corrosion resistant metallurgy

Case-3 : A new occupied facility is proposed to be set up at 200m distance of the column to house operations crew

Case-4 : The column is no more needed in the process due to lower capacities and needs to be taken out of service

Case-5 : The Reflux pump is facing cavitation due to low level in overhead receiver. It is proposed to maintain higher level in receiver beyond normal operating levels.

Should we perform PHA in each of these cases?

Case-1 : A parallel train of the column and associated equipment is planned to enhance capacity

Yes. A detailed PHA as in case of projects with a focus on impact assessment to existing process units

Case-2 : The condenser has repetitive issues of tube choking due to corrosion and PHA team recommended to replace metallurgy which corrosion resistant

Yes. Chemical-metal interaction reviews, hazard evaluation and inherently safer approach

Case-3 : A new occupied facility is proposed to be set up at 200m distance of the column to house operations crew

Yes. Hazard evaluation, consequence analysis and facility siting

Case-4 : The column is no more needed in the process due to lower capacities and needs to be taken out of service

Yes. Mothballing / decommissioning PHA with hazard identification & evaluation, human factors and inherently safer approach

Case-5 : The level in the reflux drum is maintained low and cavitating the reflux pump often; it is proposed to increase level in the receiver

Yes. The material in the receiver is highly hazardous and there is an increase in its inventory. Perform hazard evaluation and consequence analysis

- Recognise process hazards & manage risks through PHA
- Capture learnings from technology updates and incident learnings in PHA for safer designs
- Devise effective program for periodic PHA revalidation & updates during changes
- Apply tools and techniques suiting the nature of operations

Companies may be small or large – Process Safety Culture is key

“Try to change situations, not people...” – Trevor Kletz